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Abstract
When it comes to statistics, age discrimination is different than other forms of discrimination. In most
discrimination cases we can take the protected population and make appropriate adjustments for necessary
characteristics like education and compare the results to the other employee groups.
With age discrimination this method does not work. It doesn’t work because the normal patterns of aging and
promotion or wage increase distort the statistical result. Employees typically are promoted more quickly and
receive the highest percentage wage increases in early years. However, they generally retain those benefits for
life. Employees reach a high point in their careers and then age in those positions while younger employees
who have not yet reached their highest level are promoted. These phenomena require special care in
evaluating statistics in age discrimination cases.
Keywords
age discrimination, statistical proof in age discrimination, statistical distortion in age cases
Disciplines
Elder Law | Labor and Employment Law
This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/160
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692282
THE USES AND MISUSES OF STATISTICAL
PROOF
IN AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Tom Tinkham*
I. BACKGROUND AND THESIS
Over the last decade, the number and complexity of age
discrimination cases brought in the United States has increased
substantially, with many of the claims supported by statistical evidence
and then rebutted by statistics offered by the defendant.' Courts have
often looked to the law developed in discrimination cases involving sex
or race for guidance in the later developing cases involving age
discrimination. Because there are substantial differences in age
employment relationships as compared to sex or race employment
relationships, the importation of general statistical concepts from race
2and sex discrimination to age cases has not always been appropriate.
This problem is compounded by the fact that lawyers are often
unfamiliar with statistical analysis and may assume that a statistical
result in an age analysis has more significance than is in fact the case.
3
. The author was a long time partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP but with the passage of time has
become of counsel. He has represented major American corporations in a number of class action
age discrimination suits. He is also an Adjunct Professor, at William Mitchell College of Law.
The author greatly appreciates the kind assistance of Holly Eng and Mark Ginder of Dorsey &
Whitney LLP as well as Bernard Siskin of LECG in commenting on drafts of this paper.
1. See Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, Age Discrimination in US Labor Markets: A
Review of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 187, 192 (William
M. Rodgers II ed., 2006). Cases in federal court are brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). Most states have comparable statutes
prohibiting age discrimination. See, e.g., Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466,
475 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J., concurring) (citing not only federal law, but also similar state law
provisions).
2. See Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Paul
Grossman et al., "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics": How The Peter Principle Warps Statistical
Analysis ofAge Discrimination Claims, 22 LAB. LAW. 251, 251 (2007).
3. See, e.g., Hamblin v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 636 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (finding that the plaintiff did not offer evidence of a "comparably effective practice that
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Finally, it is often the case that law follows science, but unfortunately in
the area of age discrimination, there has been a lack of attention to the
economics of age discrimination, perhaps because of the difficulties in
measuring age discrimination.4
The essential problem in analyzing employment outcome based on
age is that age, unlike race or sex, is not an immutable characteristic. In
the ordinary course of life, people do not change race or sex, but they
obviously change age. All of us age, and we do so such that the impact
of aging becomes more obvious and pronounced over time, with the
likelihood of both changes in perceived abilities and discrimination
accelerating over time. Standard statistical analysis in discrimination
cases generally takes the unprotected group and compares the treatment
of that group to the treatment of the protected group to determine
whether there is a statistically significant difference. In cases of sex and
race discrimination, it is often fair to assume that with several
adjustments, such as for education and experience, the result of an
employment process, such as promotion or termination, ought to be
equivalent between the two groups. Differences, if any, can be
measured in terms of absolute numbers, standard deviations or
percentages. With age discrimination claims, the statistical comparison
is muich more difficult and at times impossible.5
Existing discrimination case law makes clear that the groups to be
compared for the analysis must in fact be comparable (similarly
situated). For many purposes, older and younger workers are not easily
compared. Moreover, many factors that can be appropriately considered
by an employer in employment decisions correlate with age, but are not
age. Some time ago, the Supreme Court concluded that decision factors
that correlate with age, but are not age, when a basis for the employment
decision, do not constitute a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA").6 Thus, years of service in a
company, even though years of service generally correlate with age,
when used for terminating an employee to avoid vesting in a pension, is
not a violation of the ADEA.7
would cause a significantly lessened adverse effect on older employees").
4. Richard W. Johnson & David Neumark, Age Discrimination, Job Separations, and
Employment Status of Older Workers: Evidence from Self-Reports, 32 J. HUM. RESOURCES 779,
780-81 (1997).
5. See id.; Robert D. Pritchard et al., Interpreting Relationships Between Age and Promotion
in Age-Discrimination Cases, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 199, 199 (1984).
6. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993); see also Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
7. Id. (holding that a decision based on tenure with the company, which coordinates with
age, was not actionable under the ADEA).
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
The most general problem of statistical analysis in age cases is that
an analysis may tell you that there is a correlation between age and an
employment practice, but the statistics will not tell you whether age
caused the correlation. Assumptions about causation are often
inappropriate in age cases. Correlation between age and salary or
promotions is not enough because correlation is not causation. 8 For
example, there is a generally recognized pattern of promotion where
promotions come early in a career at a significantly faster rate than later
in a career. 9  This may be the result of a rapid development of
experience early in a career with the employer benefiting very
substantially from that early development. With a later slowing of the
rate of development, the promotion rate slows as well. It may also
reflect the fact that most organizations are pyramid in shape, and as the
employee ages, she moves up the pyramid, where promotion
opportunities become scarce. Finally, it may reflect the fact that all of
us, or nearly all of us, reach plateaus in our employment where we come
to rest because we have reached the point at which our maximum
capabilities match the responsibilities of the position. While declining
physical ability may negatively impact older employees' performance in
some jobs, that is unlikely to be the case in today's typical management
or professional positions. Plateauing is most often the result of one's
native ability and willingness to work at a particular rate. Because of
this phenomenon, an assumption that differences in promotion rates
between younger and older workers is discriminatory is unwarranted.
A similar phenomenon is well known with regard to employee
compensation, with substantial increases coming early in a career and
slowing over time.1° This generally accepted wage curve means that
employees late in their career have wages that exceed those of younger
employees, but the younger employees have greater percentage
increases. Again, this may reflect the greater rate of acquisition of
knowledge and experience early in a career rather than later. In any
event, these factors that correlate with age, but are not age, make it very
difficult to compare newer, and thus younger, employees to older or
more tenured employees. The "null" hypothesis-that given relatively
minor adjustments, two groups should find equal employment
treatment-does not apply for age studies. One should expect that more
8. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cit. 1994) (holding that the
EEOC's contention of disparate impact, based on statistical correlation alone, was insufficient to
sustain a finding of age discrimination).
9. See Kristin McCue, Promotions and Wage Growth, 14 J. LAB. ECON. 175, 182 tbl.1
(1996).
10. Seeid. at 183tbl.2.
2010]
HeinOnline -- 27 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L. J. 359 2009-2010
] ISTICAL   A  I I I ATION 359 
t r l l   t ti ti al   t 
 i  t ll t t  i  t een   
l ent ti e, ti ti s t ll  t r  
sed  ti . ti s t ti   t  
ri te s. l ti  t een   r 
    ti  ti .s  
,  ll  ized tt r   ti   
 l     tl   t  t  l t r 
     l e t f 
i ce  r  l er fiti g  
ti ll      
 l t, ti      
t t ti s i  ,  
l  ,   r  ti  
iti s  . t f 
   t   
    t i   i  
iliti s  i ilities   
l   s'   
 ent 
l    's 
   s  f 
,    
 r  t r   
  
 l     
 to     
    
,     
  f 
    
 
,   
l  -t at  
t 
s  
   ,  t  ir.  l i  t t t  
      
t i   fi i  f  i ri i ti ). 
.   , tions   t ,  J. . . ,  t l.l 
). 
. ee .   t . . 
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL
senior employees are paid more. Because of the passage of time, senior
employees have accumulated compounding increases over the years and
generally hold higher positions in an organization, but at the same time,
their annual percentage wage increases are smaller, and promotion rates
are slower. The confounding problem for statistical analysis is to
determine how much smaller or slower is normal in the absence of
discrimination. The fact is that older and younger employees are not
similarly situated.
The second problem that plagues statistical analysis in age
discrimination cases results from the stratification of a company's
workforce into hierarchal levels of management. Because of the passage
of time and the effect of tenure, long tenured employees, that is, older
employees, are generally more heavily represented in the higher levels
of the organization, with the newer employees in the lower ranks. A
statistical analysis purporting to analyze the entire workforce as one will
fail to consider comparable employees because of the uneven
distribution of age within the different strata of the workforce. The more
senior and older employees are likely to have a slower promotion rate on
average because of, among other reasons, their place in the corporate
structure, with fewer promotions per eligible employee generally
available toward the top of the pyramid.
Analysis of age discrimination by employment strata within an
organization is just as problematic, but for different reasons. Because of
the corporate pyramid issue, standard statistical analysis requires that a
truly comparable analysis be done at distinct structural levels within the
corporation to ensure that employees who are actually comparable are
the subjects of the comparison. While this technique can be successful
in sex or race cases, it is difficult or impossible to achieve an accurate
result in an age case because of the censorship problem. In any given
stratum, the most successful employees have moved on to the next
stratum or the one above that, while the less successful employees who
remain age in the position. New employees entering the stratum will on
average be younger than those remaining. The most productive
employees will move the fastest tend to be the youngest, and include
those that will ultimately move well up the corporate ladder. Therefore,
it can be reasonably expected that younger employees will have, on
average, better evaluations and higher promotion rates in any given
stratum than older employees. In essence, this is a censorship problem,
because the most productive older employees in any strata have moved
on and are not available as a part of the comparison. The typical
statistical approach in stratifying the corporate structure results in the
exclusion of the most successful older employees. Without adjustments,
[Vol. 27:357
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
this analysis will show a statistically significant advantage in promotion
to younger employees, but the result may be caused by censorship rather
than by discrimination.
A third significant problem in age discrimination statistical work is
the fact that age is not a single characteristic such as race or sex."
Instead, it is a continuum. Outside of the fact that the federal age act is
arbitrarily set at forty years old,'2 there is no particular reason to suspect
that age discrimination begins at any particular age. In fact, it is
reasonable to think that it is just as likely that persons in their forties
may be the beneficiaries of affirmative employment decisions while
persons in their sixties may suffer the reverse. The comparative
statistical approach, which lumps together all employees forty through
seventy years old, may obscure a problem for a particular segment of
that group. On the other hand, singling out a particular age segment may
be entirely arbitrary and designed by a party to maximize the statistical
impact. The majority view in disparate impact cases is that it is
improper to use subgroups; all persons over forty must be compared. In
disparate treatment cases, using age subgroups for analysis has generally
been permitted.'
3
Fourth, disputes about the legitimacy of variables to include in a
regression are more pronounced in age discrimination cases.
Employment decisions such as promotions, salary increases or
terminations are often based on performance evaluations. To compare
employees performing at the same level, evaluations should be included
as a variable in the regression. Again, in an analysis of race and sex
claims, one can reasonably expect that, with reasonable adjustments,
performance evaluations between the groups should be equal. Unlike
race and sex performance evaluations, evaluations separated by age are
likely to show differences in the absence of discrimination. This is due
to an expected average difference in performance between newer (and
younger) employees in a stratum versus longer tenured (and older)
employees. As employees reach their maximum employment stratum
and age in that strata, one would reasonably expect that the employment
evaluations of those individuals would, on average, be lower than a
group of individuals who have recently moved into that employment
stratum, some of whom will move on through the employment strata
because of superior performance. While this pattern is logical and
11. See RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION § 7.1, at 7-4, § 7.2, at 7-4-7-5 (Thomson/West 2006).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2006).
13. EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950-51 (8th Cir. 1999).
2010]
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supported by economic research on promotions, there is no
documentation of the extent of the difference that can be expected in
evaluations absent age discrimination. Plaintiffs are likely to call
evaluations tainted because they show a significant difference in favor of
the unprotected age group. Employers will argue that the evaluations
must be included as a part of the regression in order to fairly compare
employees who are performing at similar levels within the organization.
Fifth, while the difference between practical significance and
statistical significance is present in all statistical evaluations of
discrimination, it is particularly significant in age cases because there are
often large numbers of individuals available for comparative purposes
and small differences correlated with, but not caused by, age will be
magnified in the statistical analysis. While two or three standard
deviations may be statistically significant for an inference of
discrimination in some settings, that may not be true in age cases.
Statistical significance is the measure of the likelihood that a particular
result occurs by chance. With two standard deviations, for example, the
likelihood of the result occurring by chance is less than five percent.
This result, however, does not tell one whether the outcome is
practically significant. First, when the regression does not include the
significant non-age factors causing the result, the statistical significance
is not probative of discrimination because the result may be caused by
appropriate factors. Second, the statistical significance does not tell you
the dimension of the difference. Alone it does not give you the number
of people actually negatively impacted by the process selected for any
particular evaluation. It will also not provide the degree of difference.
For example, in an age-based salary discrimination claim, a highly
statistically significant difference can relate to a practically insignificant
salary difference.14 In evaluating a class action or pattern and practice
claim, a high level of statistical significance may relate to only a small
fraction of the defined class. In an individual case, a high level of
statistical significance will not tell you whether age caused the result in
that individual situation.
These differences between age, sex and race patterns in
employment result in a variety of difficult statistical problems for age
cases that have only started to become apparent in court decisions. The
purpose of this article is to explore those difficulties in the context of the
typical legal issues presented by age discrimination cases, and to
examine where and how standard statistical methodology may be helpful
14. See Allan G. King, "Gross Statistical Disparities " as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice
of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW. 271, 279 (2007).
[Vol. 27:357
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STATISTICAL PROOF INA GE DISCRIMINATION
despite these problems.
I. COMMON STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
The most typical statistical methodology is comparison. In age
cases, one can compare the treatment of younger employees to older
employees for purposes of looking at hiring, training, promotion, salary
or termination. The problem is finding an appropriate group of each to
use for the comparison, adjusting for factors that may correlate with age
but are not age based. However, comparisons can also be used to
measure change in employment decisions for the protected group over a
period of time. One can look at the pattern of older employees' pay or
promotion at an earlier point and compare it to the time of concern. A
comparison can also be used to compare treatment of a group in one
company division or one company to other divisions or other but similar
companies. Differences that are not reasonably explained by differing
economic circumstances can lead to an inference of discrimination.
A multiple regression analysis increases the sophistication of the
statistical work but does not necessarily improve the reliability of the
outcome.15 Typically, the regression analysis seeks to identify factors
unrelated to age, race or sex that may affect the outcome, identify the
impact of those variables, and determine the remaining impact with
regard to the difference in age, race or sex. 16  For example, if the
employer argues that its hiring practices are significantly determined by
education levels, the regression analysis will include a measure for the
educational attainment of the different applicant pools. If the company
makes independent decisions at different divisions within the company,
the regression may examine applicant pools from each of those structural
divisions within the company. The point of the regression analysis is to
account for the factors that may lead to the decisions in question.
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court, in Hazelwood School
District v. United States,17 held that "[w]here gross statistical disparities
can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie
proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.' 1 8 In footnote fourteen
15. This methodology identifies conditions that may impact the outcome (independent
variables) of hiring, promotion, etc. (the dependent variable). The regression with independent
variables seeks to predict the employment outcome, isolating the protected characteristic.
16. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1977) (discussing
considerations, other than race, that need to be taken into account to determine the proper figures for
comparison).
17. Id. at 299.
18. Id. at 307-08 (citation omitted).
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of that opinion, the Court cites Castaneda v. Partida19 for the
proposition that, with a large sample, if the statistical disparity is greater
then two or three standard deviations, it is probative of discrimination.'
°
Castaneda involved a claim that a jury selection process resulted in an
improper exclusion of minority citizens. 2 1  The request was for
injunctive relief.22  Hazelwood, however, involved a claim of
discriminatory hiring by a school district, including questions of
individual discrimination and damage.23 Despite the limitation of the
Court's conclusion to the "proper case," the Court's equation of a gross
statistical disparity with two or three standard deviations has led to some
obscuring of the practical significance of statistical differences. While
two standard deviations means the probability of the event occurring by
chance is five percent, and three standard deviations means the
probability of it occurring by chance is less than three tenths of one
percent, that will not necessarily inform us as to what caused the results
or whether the difference is practically significant.24
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") uses
an eighty percent rule as a measure of discriminatory conduct.25  That
rule asks whether the protected class is hired, retained, or promoted at
less than eighty percent of the rate of those in the unprotected group.2 6
A rate of less than eighty percent will be considered to have an adverse
impact for disparate impact analysis. 27 This measure provides a better
representation of the significance of the difference by focusing more on
the practical impact of that difference. However, it is not particularly
useful in small group analysis, nor is it alone helpful in sorting out the
identity of the two groups to be compared, or the impact of factors other
than age.
19. 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17.
20. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309 n.14.
21. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 485-87. Castaneda involved a standard deviation of twelve where
equal treatment would have resulted in selection of approximately 688 Mexican-Americans instead
of the 339 actually selected-a statistically and practically significant difference. Id. at 496-97
n. 17. For purposes of injunctive relief, these differences were clearly actionable. See id. at 496.
22. See id. at 485-86 (discussing that respondent sought a new trial because of the
discrimination in the grand jury selection process, which he wanted changed).
23. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 301, 303.
24. Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 179, 191 (2d ed. 2000); Paul Meier et al., What
Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 139,163 (1984).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2009).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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STATISTICAL PROOF IN AGE DISCRIMINATION
In Bazemore v. Friday,28 the Court considered the question of those
variables to be included in a regression analysis. 29 In that case, black
employees sued the North Carolina Extension Service and others for
discrimination in salary.30 There were multiple regression analyses
performed with a number of independent variables, including education,
tenure, and job title. In at least one regression, performance evaluations
were also considered. 31 The district court claimed that performance was
the key factor in determining salary and should have been used in all
regressions.32 The Court held: "Normally, failure to include variables
will affect the analysis' probativeness, not its admissibility. 33 Footnote
ten to that statement added: "There may, of course, be some regressions
so incomplete as to be inadmissible as irrelevant; but such was clearly
not the case here." 34 These statements have made it difficult to exclude
31statistical analyses in discrimination cases.
In 1997, the Court decided the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ,36 holding that the trial courts had a responsibility
to act as gatekeepers of expert witness testimony to ensure that the
evidence presented met minimum standards of reliability.37 The expert
work must display "the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes" the general practice of experts in the field.38  The
relationship today between Daubert and the Bazemore comment that
failure to include variables will not affect admissibility is in some doubt
where those variables are such that standard statistical practice would
require inclusion of the variables to ensure analysis of truly comparable
groups.39
28. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
29. Id. at 399-400 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 391-92.
31. Id. at 398.
32. Id. at 404 n.15.
33. Id. at 400; Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 468 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400).
34. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400 n.10.
35. Morgan, 380 F.3d at 468 ("While the omission of variables from a regression analysis
may render the analysis less probative than it otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some
other infirmity, that an analysis must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination."
(quoting Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400)); see also Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F.
Supp. 2d 16, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating plaintiff used statistical evidence to bolster his
discrimination claim).
36. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
37. Id. at 597.
38. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
39. See Morgan, 380 F.3d at 468 n.5; Sean W. Colligan, In Good Measure: Workforce
Demographics and Statistical Proof of Discrimination, 23 LAB. LAW. 59, 65 (2007) ("[I]n any
statistical study, the validity of the results will depend upon how accurately the statistical modeling
20~1
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In any event, when admitted the analysis must consider groups
sufficiently comparable to permit an inference of discrimination or the
statistics alone will be insufficient to prevent summary judgment. If
there are common and nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity,
logically it will be difficult to draw an inference of discrimination absent
adjustments in the regression for those factors.4a It is not yet clear who
has the burden of demonstrating that a particular variable should be
included or not included in the regression. The plaintiff can be seen as
having the burden to demonstrate that the statistical evidence it presents
is probative where the variable is one that is clearly relevant. Courts
have concluded in those instances that the plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the analysis creates an inference of discrimination.a
On the other hand, some courts have concluded that even an incomplete
comparative analysis creates at least an inference that the result is not
due to chance.42 In those cases, the report is admissible because it
demonstrates part of the plaintiff's burden, and it is the responsibility of
the defendant to show that a particular legitimate variable significantly
affected the outcome so that the regression analysis result would be
significantly modified by inclusion of that factor.4 3 The allocation of the
burden of demonstrating factors to be included in a regression is
significant in age discrimination cases, particularly with regard to the
inclusion of performance evaluations where, as in many cases, the
employer relies upon such evaluations for its employment decisions.
The allocation of burden may determine whether or not inclusion of
performance evaluation data is necessary to make a report probative of
discrimination.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AGE CLAIMS HIGHLIGHTS THOSE
AREAS WHERE STATISTICS MAY BE RELEVANT
Many age claims are brought as class actions. Developing class
action law has resulted in greater emphasis on statistical evidence at the
class certification stage then there has been in the past.44  For
reflects the real world process it is designed to study.").
40. See Morgan, 380 F.3d at 471; see also Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414,
425-27 (7th Cir. 2000).
41. See, e.g., Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. See id. at 1044-45 (defendant rebutted plaintiff's statistical evidence by showing that if
plaintiff had considered variables such as scholarly productivity or teacher evaluations, the results
would have been significantly different).
44. See generally David S. Evans, Class Certification, the Merits, and Expert Evidence, II
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 7-27 (2002) (discussing the split in the circuit courts over the use of
[Vol. 27:357
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
certification, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) ("Rule 23") requires
a showing of numerous potential class members, commonality and
typicality, in addition to a showing that the representative parties will
fairly and adequately represent the class.45  Generally, age actions
seeking damages will be regarded as Rule 23(b)(3) class actions so that
the parties seeking certification will also have to show that common
questions predominate, and that the class action is superior to other
available methods to resolve the dispute.46 The requirements of
commonality and predominance normally necessitate a statistical
showing that adverse actions of the employer have generally impacted
the class so that claims of a representative party are typical of other
members of the defined class.
For decades, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin47 was thought to limit
the degree to which a court would examine statistical evidence offered at
the certification stage.48 Eisen distinguished between merits and Rule 23
analysis to hold that a court should not determine the merits of the case
at the class certification stage.49 In many types of class actions,
including those involving discrimination claims, merit and Rule 23
questions often overlap. 50  Thus, in an age discrimination case, the
plaintiff might develop statistical evidence to show a pattern and practice
of age discrimination, as well as to show that an employer's proffered
explanation for the decisions was pretextual. This very same statistical
evidence, however, would be used by the party to establish commonality
and predominance. Historically, even where the defendant offered
statistical evidence to rebut the plaintiff's evidence, courts were reluctant
to examine the statistical evidence in any detail and often credited the
plaintiffs evidence without examination to avoid consideration of the
merits of the case.5'
This lack of rigorous analysis of statistical evidence offered at a
certification stage is rapidly changing. The newest decisions are
establishing several propositions relevant to this issue. First, the parties
seeking certification must show by a preponderance of the evidence,
evidence that goes towards the merits during the class certification process).
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
46. Id. 23(b)(3).
47. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
48. id. at 177; Colligan, supra note 39, at 63 (citations omitted).
49. Eisen, 417 U.S at 177-78 (citations omitted).
50. E.g., Whitaker v. 3M Co., 764 N.W.2d 631, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (showing the
overlap of questions of merit and Rule 23 at the class certification stage of an age discrimination
suit).
51. See, e.g., Hnot v. Willis Group Holdings, Ltd., 241 F.R.D. 204, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Hnot v. Willis Group Holdings, Ltd., 228 F.R.D. 476, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
2010]
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rather than simply establishing a prima facie case, that the Rule 23
elements are met. 52 Second, the court deciding certification must weigh
the evidence, including the evidence offered by the responding party, to
determine whether the elements of Rule 23 are met. 53 Finally, the court
should examine the expert testimony, including the statistical evidence
presented, resolve disputes and make a determination whether, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that evidence satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23.
In the context of age discrimination cases this developing law
means that the issues of statistical validity will come before the court at
a relatively early point in the litigation. The parties will be forced to
fully develop statistical evidence for a class certification hearing. The
court will be required to assess the validity of the statistical evidence
offered to determine whether there is commonality and, in damage cases,
whether common questions predominate across the class. While this
procedure is in place, there is of yet no answer to the question of the
necessary probative power of the statistical evidence to establish
commonality and predominance. To what degree will the courts insist
that comparisons be made between groups that share common attributes?
Will the statistical evidence be required to show that a significant
portion of the class has the same claim as the representative parties?
While recognizing that discrimination by definition relates to a
class, the Supreme Court held: "Conceptually, there is a wide gap
between (a) an individual's claim that he has been denied promotion on
discriminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported allegation that
the company has a policy of discrimination, and (b) the existence of a
class of persons who have suffered the same injury ....
In the context of class certification, it is typically statistical
evidence, augmented by anecdotal evidence, which seeks to fill this
"wide gap." The use of statistics for class certification presents two
general questions: how reliable are the statistics to create an inference of
discrimination, and what is the class of persons that statistics can
identify?
52. Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202
(2d Cir. 2009); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
53. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307; In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24,
42 (2d Cir. 2006).
54. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307; Whitaker, 764 N.w.2d at 638. See also Blades v.
Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Nonetheless, such disputes may be resolved
only insofar as resolution is necessary to determine the nature of the evidence that would be
sufficient, if the plaintiff's general allegations were true, to make out a prima facie case for the
class.").
55. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982).
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
Generally, discrimination claims are brought as disparate impact
claims, disparate treatment claims, or both.56 Disparate impact claims
identify an apparently neutral employment process and demonstrate that
the result is discriminatory.57 The particular portion of a plan or system
causing the discrimination must be identified specifically. 58 There must
be a causal connection between the identified system and the disparity. 9
The employer may defend by offering a reasonable basis other than age
for the decision.6 °
Disparate treatment claims, on the other hand, require a showing
that a particular decision was motivated by bias.61  Because disparate
impact claims relate solely to a process and its result, statistical evidence
is typically required.62 With the proper statistical analysis, commonality
and predominance for class certification in disparate impact claims is
often apparent. Disparate treatment claims, however, are typically
individual in nature and are difficult to certify.63  To establish
predominance, disparate treatment claims require a demonstration of at
least a pattern or practice or a common decision maker so that significant
evidence will be common. 64 Even with these factors in place, in most
disparate impact cases, individual questions will be more significant than
common questions, because the essence of each claim will depend on an
analysis of one person's qualifications compared to others.
The individual age action can be brought on the basis of direct
evidence, where the plaintiff can offer statements by the decision makers
that show a direct age bias. In that event, statistical evidence may not be
necessary. However, most age cases proceed on the basis of
circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence and follow the
familiar pattern of the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green analysisapplicable in other types of discrimination claims.66 By that analysis, the
56. See Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 953 (citation omitted).
58. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (citation omitted).
59. See Evers, 241 F.3d at 954.
60. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 2 4 0-4 1 .
61. See Evers, 241 F.3d at 955.
62. Id. at 953 (citation omitted).
63. Talley v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 260, 266, 270 (D. Md. 2004) (citation omitted).
64. See id. at 266 (citation omitted); Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 526, 539
(N.D. Ala. 2001).
65. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
66. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The Court had
not addressed the question of whether the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to age
discrimination suits, but assumed it was applicable. Id. This procedure has been noted by the
Supreme Court, but not yet approved in age cases. In age cases where the legitimate reasons for
differences in treatment between older and younger workers outweigh the likelihood of invidious
2010]
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plaintiff proceeds to establish a prima facie case based upon relevant but
minimal evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was (1) a member of a
protected class; (2) the employee performed the duties of the job
adequately; (3) the employee was not promoted, discharged or not given
an appropriate raise; and (4) persons in the non-protected class were
treated more favorably either in pay, promotion or retention.67 Meeting
the four part prima facie test, including demonstrating that members in
the protected class were treated less favorably than others, creates an
inference of discrimination for a prima facie case.
In the circumstantial case, after the employee has established a
prima facie case, the burden of production, but not of persuasion, shifts
to the employer, who must articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the
68contested employment action. 8 The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act permits the employer to differentiate "based on reasonable factors
other than age.', 69 After the employer's explanation, the burden is on the
employee to establish that the employer's offered reason is a pretext.70
Evidence of pretext is sufficient to allow a jury to conclude that the
motive was discriminatory.71  Significantly stronger evidence is
necessary to show pretext than for a prima facie case because it is now
necessary to eliminate the employer's offered explanation.72 Statistical
evidence often plays a significant role in this proof pattern. The parties
may offer conflicting statistical evidence as to whether persons in the
protected class generally were treated less favorably than others. The
same evidence may be offered or augmented to show that the employer's
stated reason does not statistically explain the adverse impact on the
protected class and thus is a pretext.
The extent to which the regression analysis includes the most
significant factors that may impact employment decisions should, along
with an analysis of the results' practical significance, determine whether
an inference of discrimination is appropriate. However, statistical
correlation is not causation, and individual decision facts in a disparate
treatment case must ultimately determine whether discrimination caused
reasons, establishing a prima facie case based solely on different treatment is not compelling. The
issue of age discrimination is more appropriately resolved on proof that the employer's explanation
is a pretext.
67. See id.
68. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2009). Even in mixed motive
cases, the burden of proof never shifts from the plaintiff. See id. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006).
70. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 148.
72. Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 461 F.3d 982, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
an individual result. 73
Bazemore established a relatively low standard of admissibility for
statistical evidence in discrimination cases.74 The failure to include a
variable will affect the probative value, but not necessarily the
admissibility, unless the comparison or regression is obviously
incomplete.75 As discussed earlier, Daubert, however, suggests that
where a regression is so incomplete that it can be said that experts in the
field would generally not conclude the analysis was appropriate, a court
should exclude the expert testimony and statistical analysis.76
Admissibility, however, does not mean that the statistics are sufficient to
demonstrate a portion of the prima facie case; that is, that members of
the protected class were treated less favorably then others.77 If clearly
legitimate reasons that may explain the disparity are not included in the
regression analysis, the analysis may not be sufficiently probative to
78even demonstrate less favorable treatment of the protected group.
However, the issue at the prima facie stage is whether the protected
group received less favorable treatment. Since the circumstantial test at
this stage does not require demonstrating the reason for this treatment, a
statistical comparison that does not exclude all permitted reasons may be
considered probative. Even where the study demonstrates sufficient
inferential power to constitute evidence that a group was treated less
favorably, it may not be sufficient to demonstrate pretext. For example,
if the employer's explanation for the disparate treatment is that a history
of evaluations explains the disparate result, unless the statistical study is
regressed for the evaluation results or there is a demonstration that the
evaluations themselves result from discriminatory behavior, the
statistical study will not provide the necessary evidence of pretext.79
Absent a showing that the employer's offered explanation does not
explain the unfavorable treatment, the employer's reason stands
unrebutted and pretext is not shown.
Despite the comment in Bazemore, because of the low threshold for
relevance, even inadequate statistical evidence is generally considered
73. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459, 466 (8th Cir. 2004);
Krieg v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 998, 1002 (11 th Cir. 1983).
74. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400-01 (1986).
75. See Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157, 1167 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
76. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993). But see Diehl, 933 F.
Supp. at 1167.
77. See Licausi v. Symantec Corp., No. 08-60544, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55294, at *32 (S.D.
Fla. June 30, 2009) (citations omitted).
78. See id. (citation omitted).
79. See, e.g., Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 958-59 (8th Cir. 2001).
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relevant.80  Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines
"[r]elevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 8' If a study is done that does not contain the appropriate
elements in the regression but compares the protected and unprotected
class, concluding that there is a significant statistical deviation, this
study, flawed as it may be, demonstrates that the results of an
employer's decision process is not random as between protected and
unprotected groups. It is of consequence to the ultimate determination
as to whether the protected class is treated less favorably. The fact that
there is an adverse result for the protected group that it is not random has
at least a tendency to make it more likely that the class suffered
discrimination, and the evidence is relevant. Again, whether that
relevant evidence has any ultimate power to create an inference either
that the distinction was age-related or that the employer's offered reason
is pretextual is an entirely different matter.
The plaintiffs evidence must establish that "but for" age, the
plaintiff would have been retained, promoted or given additional
compensation. It is no longer sufficient simply to show that age was a
factor in the decision.83 There must now be a demonstration that it was
the factor leading to the adverse result.84 Moreover, the decision must
have been based on age, rather than a phenomenon that is not age but
correlates with age.85 For example, in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,86 the
employer based its decision on the length of the employee's tenure,
which would have shortly resulted in a vested pension benefit. 87 The
Court distinguished length of service from age, even though the two
clearly correlate, concluding that this employment decision did not run
afoul of the ADEA.88 To be substantially probative, statistical analysis
must account for factors that correlate with age but are not age.89 Thus,
80. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("While the
omission of variables from a regression analysis may render the analysis less probative than it
otherwise might be, it can hardly be said, absent some other infirmity, that an analysis which
accounts for the major factors 'must be considered unacceptable as evidence of discrimination."').
81. FED. R. EVID. 401.
82. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 2349.
84. Id. at 2350 (citation omitted).
85. Seeid. at2351.
86. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
87. Id. at 607.
88. Id. at 608-09, 611.
89. Seeid. at611.
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
if employee evaluations, promotion rates, or pay increases correlate with
age, but may be caused by events such as prior promotions or prior pay
raises, those must be considered in any comparison to truly show age
discrimination.
IV. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
COMPENSATION CLAIMS
In compensation discrimination cases involving age or sex, after
adjustments for perhaps education, position and tenure, one can
reasonably assume that compensation results will be relatively equal
across gender and racial lines. While it is not without controversy, the
same cannot be said with regard to age and compensation. Economists
generally recognize an age/wage curve. 90  The age/wage curve
recognizes that as tenure in the workforce, and thus age, increase, wages
or salary increase steeply in early years, and flatten or even slightly
decrease in later years.9' Economists generally ascribe this phenomenon
to the fact that early in a career a person develops job skills at a rapid
rate and as one becomes more accustomed to the job, the rate of increase
in skill, warranting increased compensation declines. 92 The fact that
there is an early very substantial increase in skill or ability in a job leads
to a rapidly increasing salary, but then both level out over the course of
years. This phenomenon is generally accepted as representative of the
compensation pattern in the workforce in the United States.93 The
90. See, e.g., WALTER B. CONNOLLY, JR. ET AL., USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION § 10.05(l)(b) (2009); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Empirical Age-
Earning Profits, 8 J. LAB. ECON. 202, 202 (1990).
91. See, e.g., Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 861 F.2d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988) (Professors'
"salaries tend to rise rapidly in the early stages of their career and to reach a plateau when the
academic becomes a full professor."); Murphy & Welch, supra note 90, at 204, 206 (based on the
authors' statistical analysis of the wages of a group of white men between 1964 and 1987, wages
increased early in the career and declined slightly as the men approached retirement age). A Bureau
of Labor Statistics Study of 9964 people reported the following average wage increases by age
category: 18-22-7%; 23-27-5.3%; 28-32-3.1%; 33-37-3.6%; and 38-42-1.4%. News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Number of Jobs Held, Labor Market
Activity, and Earnings Growth Among the Youngest Baby Boomers: Results from a Longitudinal
Survey tbl.5 (June 27, 2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Robert H. Topel & Michael P. Ward, Job Mobility and the Careers of Young
Men, 107 Q.J. ECON. 439, 474 (1992) ("IT]he key element leading to the eventual durability of jobs
is the wage, growth of which is largely an outcome of the search process itself. . . and the decline in
average mobility as experience accumulates is mainly attributable to locating... a [good] match.").
93. See generally Murphy & Welch, supra note 90, at 207 fig.2 (showing that the actual
average earnings of all men, regardless of education, increased rapidly in the beginning of their
careers, then continued to increase at a slower pace before leveling off, and even slightly
decreasing, at the end of their careers); News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 91, at 3
20101
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implication of this for any particular age/compensation case is that more
tenured and, thus, older workers will generally have higher
compensation at any point in time, but will also have lower periodic
increases.
Some argue that this pattern represents the workforce generally, but
not necessarily the result in any particular company.94 It is argued that
within a company, where employees are not changing employers, there
should be continuing substantial increases in wage throughout the course
of careers. This argument is at odds with the prevailing economic
explanation for the phenomenon that there is a decrease in the rate of
acquisition of knowledge, experience, and ability as employees increase
tenure and age. There is no reason to believe this should happen any
less if an employee remains in the same company. While a change of
employers on average does result in higher pay, younger employees
change jobs more often than older employees. 95 This may cause the
general wage curve to become steeper in early years, but it should not
substantially change the pattern that can be expected in any company
with long tenured employees. Unfortunately, there are very few
statistics from individual companies available to support or refute the
argument. In the absence of specific company information, the
countrywide data is the most convincing evidence available and is
consistent with the economic theory.
With this pattern, older workers will generally be paid a higher
salary than younger workers.96 For the entire corporation, this reflects,
in part, the fact that older workers tend to occupy the higher positions,
which are best compensated, in the corporate structure. But the
phenomenon is also true at any level in the corporate structure. In part,
this reflects the fact that older workers tend to have more tenure on
average than younger workers at any strata within the corporate
structure. So, even within a single employment stratum, more senior
employees will generally be paid more than younger employees, but
they will, on average, have lower rates of increases in compensation. In
part, this reflects a higher base salary for older employees so that an
identical dollar increase will generate a higher percentage increase for a
(discussing that, in a study of Americans born during the later years of the baby boom, earnings of
workers "increased most rapidly while they were young," and then slowed as they got older).
94. See generally James N. Brown, Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job
Training and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed Within Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 971,990 (1989)
("[W]ages increase with tenure [at a particular firm] primarily because productivity increases with
tenure.").
95. See McCue, supra note 9, at 181-82.
96. See, e.g., Adams & Neumark, supra note 1, at 201.
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STATISTICAL PROOF IN AGE DISCRIMINATION
younger employee. Even the absolute dollar increases for the average
older employee in any grade will be smaller than those received by the
younger employees. This is a reflection of two factors. First, in any
strata, the two groups of employees, older and younger, are performing
much the same functions, but the older employees are being paid more.
The younger employees performing as well at the same level can
reasonably expect a greater increase in order to narrow the gap. Second,
the difference in the rate of increase will often reflect a difference in
performance reviews, with the average longer-term employees in any
grade receiving an evaluation slightly lower than those employees newer
to the particular grade.9 s
A typical annual salary increase regression for older and younger
employees by strata will show a difference in favor of younger
employees. At the same time, a regression for total salary will show a
difference in favor of the older employees. This pattern may be argued
to be detrimental to older employees because they receive smaller
increases. Practically, it is not detrimental because early raises cumulate
over time, and the older employee enjoys the benefit of that
accumulation as long as he is retained by the company. In fact, this
pattern is more beneficial to the older employee than uniform salary
increases throughout a career. The early large increases provide a
continuing benefit.
Pertinent information from a large American based industrial
conglomerate is available to test these general propositions.98 Using that
company's 6000-based management employees as an example of salary
distribution, as of 2005 the average salary for those under the age of
thirty was $67,384. That average salary climbed very substantially
through the group ages forty-one through forty-five, and then more
slowly so that the group sixty years and older had an average salary of
$118,889. 99 A regression analysis of total compensation prepared for the
company, controlling for job level and other factors, demonstrated that
managers older than age forty-six earned on average nearly $2,000 more
per year than managers younger than age forty-six.'00 The difference
had widened substantially during the 2001-2005 timeframe. This
97. See discussion infra p. 29.
98. The author has been counsel of record in defending a member of age discrimination
claims. The statistical information referenced and also the information in the Appendix was part of
the record in one of those proceedings. For statistical purposes, the claim period in that suit was
2001-2005.
99. See Appendix 1.
100. See Appendix 1. Forty-six years of age was the breakpoint chosen by plaintiffs for their
class definition.
2010]
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reflected a standard deviation of well in excess of three and was clearly
statistically significant in favor of older workers. On the other hand, an
expert for plaintiffs concluded that there was a significant statistical
deviation in the compensation increases between groups over and under
forty-six years old. These studies did not include all performance
evaluation parameters or all prior experience as part of the regression.
This expert went on to conclude, again without including performance in
the regression, that employees over forty-six years old had about a .5%
less annual percentage compensation increase than younger employees.
The wage studies in that situation illustrate the difficulty of
measuring age discrimination in compensation by annual increases
across age groups. First, unless the study includes a regression factor for
base salary, it fails to compare truly comparable employee groups. Most
employers will base annual compensation decisions, in part, on the
employees' overall level of compensation, and older and younger
employee groups have different base salaries. Second, without a
regression variable for all performance factors considered by the
employer in setting salaries, the study is unlikely to adequately represent
comparable employees. Since comparable groups of older and younger
employees are likely to have somewhat different evaluation results
caused by factors other than age, a regression analysis without this factor
will convey a misleading result. Finally, the large numbers involved in
compensation regression analysis often obscure the lack of practical
significance of the data. 10' Depending upon the regression factors used,
the differences in compensation increase rates may well exceed two
standard deviations and be statistically significant.
However, if the amount involved is, as reported above, in the
neighborhood of .5%, the results may not be practically significant. Let
us say, for example, the average salary is $80,000 per year and the
difference, without regard to performance, between older and younger
groups is .5%; the actual dollar difference is $400. Where older
employees at any level are paid nearly $2,000 per year more than
younger employees, and that difference has increased in the recent past,
a $400 additional payment to younger employees as an annual raise has
dubious practical significance. Given the expected difference in average
performance between older and younger workers in a given stratum,
much of that difference may disappear if performance is added to the
regression.
A regression analysis of annual changes in compensation without
controls for performance or base salary, absent evidence of why those
101. See Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 191-92.
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
factors should be eliminated, will not be probative of age
discrimination. 0 2  A study that included those variables and also
considered the stratification within the company would be significant in
demonstrating the presence or absence of discrimination. It still would
be necessary that the different amounts of compensation increases are
practically significant.'0 3  There are, however, simpler and more
satisfying ways to look at age discrimination and compensation. An
analysis that considers total compensation and regresses for job level
within the company should reflect a substantial compensation advantage
to more senior employees due to tenure. A study that demonstrates that,
on average, younger employees are paid more then older employees
would be probative of discrimination. Additionally, unless satisfactorily
explained, a significant modification of the company's historic pattern of
overall compensation to the detriment of older employees would also be
probative of age discrimination.
V. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN PROMOTION
DECISIONS
In gender or race discrimination cases, a trier of fact can reasonably
assume that, given appropriate adjustments, regression analysis should
result in equality of promotion rates between the two measured groups.
That is not the case with comparisons between younger and older
employees. Generally, older employees are promoted less frequently
than younger employees for reasons that have nothing to do with age
discrimination. 104
There are two separate phenomena that lead to this result. First, in
most corporations there is a pyramid structure reflecting a corporate
hierarchy, from beginning employees through managers, directors and,
finally, officers. As one moves up this corporate pyramid, there are
obviously fewer positions and often fewer opportunities for promotion.
At lower levels, there are often in line promotions available, which
depend on tenure or productivity regardless of openings. Younger
employees will more frequently have these promotion opportunities.
102. Whether past pay, and thus base salary, is discriminatory, so as to be a "tainted" variable,
can also be subject to dispute. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 380 F.3d 459,
470 (8th Cir. 2004). However, where older workers have significantly higher base salaries than
younger comparable employees, a claim of historic "taint" will be difficult to establish.
103. See Pritchard et al., supra note 5, at 199.
104. Grossman et al., supra note 2, at 262 (citations omitted); see also Edward P. Lazear, The
Peter Principle: Promotions and Declining Productivity 23, 26 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8094, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8094.
2010]
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Generally, the higher ranks will see greater concentrations of older
versus younger workers. Thus, the older workers company-wide will
have fewer opportunities for promotion, and where comparisons are
done on a company-wide basis, the older employee group should have
fewer promotions.
0 5
Even if a company-wide regression analysis includes personnel
evaluation results, this will not cure the pyramid problem. First, it
simply will not cure the fact that there are fewer promotion opportunities
available for older employees because they cluster at the top of the
pyramid. Moreover, it is inappropriate to compare evaluations of older
and younger workers across the entire corporate structure. Since older
workers are typically concentrated more at the top of the pyramid,
10 6
they will have the harder jobs with the most rigorous competition, and
their evaluations will reflect their more difficult environment.
Second, within any particular employment level of a company, on
average, the younger employees in that stratum are likely to be better
performers, and thus more promotable, than the older employees.0 7 To
illustrate this, take an example where six newly hired thirty-five-year-
olds are in a particular stratum. Over the next five years, three of those
employees are promoted to the next stratum, leaving behind three forty-
year-olds. During that time, the company hires three additional thirty-
five-year-olds, who have the same average talent as the earlier class.
However, the most talented persons from the original class, all of whom
are now forty years old, have moved on. The lesser talented forty-year-
olds are now competing against the average talent of the thirty-five-year-
olds. Assuming a reasonably accurate promotion system, it is likely that
more of the promotions over the next five years will come from the
younger group. As time moves on, this process is repeated, with the
persons who are aging in a particular stratum less and less likely to be
promoted simply because those with the superior talent in that age group
have already been promoted. Absent adjustments for speed of success or
performance evaluations, any promotion study of a particular
employment stratum is very likely to show a significant standard
deviation for promotion rates between older and younger employees in
the stratum, but this will reflect performance differences, even in the
absence of discrimination.
105. See, e.g., Beers v. Nynex Material Enters. Co., No. 88 Civ. 0305 (MBM), 1992 WL 8299,
at *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1992).
106. See Pritchard et at., supra note 5, at 200.
107. See Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, 241 F.3d 948, 958 (8th Cir. 2001); Cope v. McPherson,
594 F. Supp. 171, 175 (D.D.C. 1984); Pritchard et al., supra note 5, at 200; Lazear, supra note 104,
at 22-23.
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STATISTICAL PROOF INA GE DISCRIMINATION
This phenomenon can be visualized in another way. Take the
situation where you have two associate professors. Professor A spent
three years as an assistant professor and has just been promoted to
associate professor. Professor B was eight years as an assistant
professor and has just been promoted to associate professor. Given
Professor A's rapid rate of promotion, it is much more likely that
Professor A will be a full professor before Professor B, in spite of the
fact that Professor B is likely older than Professor A. The speed of prior
success is an indicator of the speed of future success. Finally, this
problem can be visualized as one of censorship. In a study done of any
given stratum's promotion rates, the very best employees that were in
that stratum have already been promoted to higher levels. A comparison
of those remaining excludes the most competent of those older
employees who were in that stratum and compares the less able group to
the newer and younger employees entering the stratum who include the
average performers, the stars, and the superstars. The stars and
superstars from the older group have been censored out of the analysis,
and the comparison is one that, absent adjustments, will show
differences in promotion rates in the absence of any discrimination.
There is national data available on promotion rates by age across
companies and industries. Generally, this data indicates that, on average
across a broad spectrum of employers, promotion rates rise quickly and
early in employee careers, and then gradually decline over careers so
that employees with thirty years or more tenure have promotion rates
half to one-third of those relatively newly hired.108 While superficially
this can be seen as a negative for older workers, in fact, the phenomenon
is generally positive for both younger and older workers. An employee
promoted young retains the benefit of that promotion for a long time.
Identical promotion rates for younger and older employees would
generally mean more promotions later in careers, to the average
disadvantage of all employees.
In the case of the large industrial conglomerate discussed earlier,
plaintiffs claimed that promotion rates for younger employees were
greatly in excess of those for older employees. Within any particular
employment stratum, plaintiffs argued their statistical analysis showed
statistically significant differences in promotion rates for older
employees as compared to those who were younger. On the other hand,
statistical evidence also showed that, across the fourteen employment
strata studied, the average age of employees increased substantially as
one moved higher up the corporate structure. The average age for the
108. See McCue, supra note 9, at 188.
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beginning management strata was approximately forty-three, while the
average age in the strata at the top of the management structure was
about fifty. The senior officers were, on average, just below fifty-five in
average age.' 
09
Statistics on promotions at this company were available back to at
least 1975. During the period contested in the lawsuit, 2001 through
2005, the promotion rates for older employees generally exceeded the
promotion rates for older employees during the period from 1975 to
2000. A longitudinal comparison of five-year cohort promotion rates
from 1975 through 2005 showed that the pattern for each cohort was
similar. While there were increases or decreases in promotion rates that
applied generally to all cohorts during particular years when the
company was expanding or retracting, the pattern showed a very early
and substantial increase in promotion rates after employees were hired,
reaching a high point after several years, and then gradually decreasing
through thirty years of tenure." 0  Applying a standard regression
analysis across cohorts at any earlier point in this twenty-five year
longitudinal study demonstrated a statistically significant deviation
between older and younger employees in promotion rates, at least as
pronounced as the statistical significance found during the class period
of 2001 through 2005."' The historic pattern of apparent adverse
promotion rates for older and younger employees, however, resulted in
an ultimate employment pattern where older employees occupied a very
substantial proportion of most senior positions in the company. As this
example demonstrates, age is different than gender or race claims
because we all age. Someone promoted, for example, at ages thirty-five
and thirty-seven, most likely occupies the more advanced position when
they are forty-five, fifty, or sixty years old.
It is theoretically possible to adjust a regression analysis to
appropriately reflect the non-age based differences between promotion
rates for younger and older employees. However, these adjustments are
likely to be controversial and difficult to implement. The essential
problem is that there is not an agreement on what the difference should
be, absent discrimination. The attempts to create such systems have
been overly complex. They have been based on multiple subjective
assumptions, which will most often be in dispute, but will determine the
result.'1
2
109. See Appendix 2.
110. See Appendix 3.
111. See Appendix 4.
112. Examples of those systems are the (i) Predictive Computer Model, Grossman, supra note
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
Regressing for employment evaluation results is one method that
may adjust for differing performance within an employment stratum.
One might assume that within any employment stratum, employee
evaluations should reflect differences in average ability between younger
and older employees caused by past promotions of the most able older
employees. However, there are at least two problems in adjusting a
promotion regression for performance evaluations. First, the
performance evaluations may not be sophisticated enough for fine
statistical evaluation. For example, in many settings it is not unusual to
have a very high percentage of employees rated above average with little
differentiation. Many evaluation systems measure and evaluate
immediate past-performance and do not have a measure for the
employee's capacity to handle increased responsibility. These attributes
may be more likely evaluated at the time promotion is considered.
Second, even where there is substantial differentiation, there may well
be a disagreement among the parties as to whether or not the employee
evaluations are accurate or also reflect age discrimination.
There is a significant body of law in the age discrimination area
which holds that where an employer makes promotion decisions on the
basis of evaluations, an appropriate statistical study must regress for that
factor. 113 However, if the evaluations can be shown to be "tainted" by
age discrimination, the evaluations would not have to be included in the
regression.114 Generally, it is the responsibility of the defendant to show
that the omitted variable will substantially effect the outcome. 1 5 The
question remains: if the variable is significant, who has the burden of
proof to demonstrate that it is "tainted" or not and how does the court
evaluate such a claim? Logically, the plaintiff should prove "taint" as
part of his burden of showing discrimination. The plaintiff normally
offers the statistics to prove pattern and practice or pretext.' 1 6 Proving
that the statistics create an inference logically includes a demonstration
2, at 260-61, (ii) Duration Dependence, id. at 262-65, (iii) Performance Evaluations, id. at 265-67,
and (iv) Age-Promotion Model, Pritchard, supra note 5, at 201.
113. See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000); Hutson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1995); Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d
1450, 1456 (10th Cir. 1994); Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1320 (E.D.
Mich. 1976). Failure to include all the historic evaluation data or the data relied on by the decision
maker in the regression skews the result. See Morgan v. UPS, 380 F.3d 459, 470-71 (8th Cir.
2004); Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157, 1168-69 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
114. Morgan, 380 F.3d at 470; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1986)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting regression analysis of salary because it contained salary figures
reflecting the effect of racial discrimination).
115. See PAETZOLD & WILBORN, supra note 11, § 6.15.
116. E.g., Morgan, 380 F.3d at 463.
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that they have included the proper regression factors. If the defendant is
required to prove a negative lack of taint, the burden of proof, rather
than production to prove the non-discriminatory rationale, is shifted to
the defendant contrary to the standard McDonnell Douglas
formulation. 17 This issue is not yet settled, but if the burden of proof is
to remain with the plaintiff on the issue of pretext, the plaintiff should
prove the "taint." 
8
Plaintiffs will offer evidence to show that there is a difference in the
evaluations between the older and younger employee group in any
particular company employment stratum. The defendant will respond
that this is normal and expected given the censorship of the most able
senior employees from the studied group. There are simply no available
benchmarks in the literature to show the extent to which such
evaluations will vary absent age discrimination. In fact, the
phenomenon may be quite company-specific depending on the size of
the employment strata and the speed of promotion within the company.
It is now clear, however, that typically evaluations compared in a given
company strata will show some advantage in younger workers." 9 That
fact alone does not establish that the evaluations are "tainted." Where
historic evaluation results are available, it is possible to compare the
current evaluations to the historic results to see if there are significant
changes for an older group of employees. It may be possible to compare
evaluations within a company to show that a particular decision-maker
has a different and discriminatory pattern of conduct. Absent definitive
proof of whether or not the evaluations are discriminatory, permitted
exclusion may depend entirely on where the burden of proof is assigned.
Arguably, another way to adjust for the differences in a stratum
between older and younger employee promotion rates is to regress for
117. Compare Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1995)
(holding that once the defendant has met its burden of production by articulating a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for the employee's termination, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove the explanation is a pretext for discrimination), with Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct.
2343, 2352 (2009) ("The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show it would have
taken the action regardless of age ....").
118. See Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 881 (D.D.C. 1981) (explaining that under current
law, plaintiffs have the burden of proof in discrimination cases; and that statistics often play a role
in that proof); Ottaviana v. State Univ. of N.Y., 875 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining the
Supreme Court's process for evaluating disparate treatment claims and explaining that "the ultimate
burden of persuasion rests always with the plaintiff ... ").
119. See, e.g., Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1285 (9th Cir. 2000)
(demonstrating that employees of the defendant over the age of forty tended to receive lower
rankings than employees below the age of forty); cf Grossman, supra note 2, at 259 ("If one were to
look only at the relationship between age and likelihood of promotion, over time in a totally
nondiscriminatory environment a negative relationship emerges ....").
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STATISTICAL PROOF INAGE DISCRIMINATION
the speed of success; that is, to compare the length of time spent in the
particular stratum, the length of time spent within the corporation to
reach that stratum, and the employee's prior speed of promotion before
joining the company. Unfortunately, this information is often difficult to
obtain and it is impossible to tell how much, if any, of that prior speed of
success may itself have been due to discriminatory decisions. Finally, a
regression for all prior work experience is very close to regressing for
age in a study of the impact of age. All of the above makes regression
analysis of the promotion rates at a point in time of dubious value when
interpreting claims of age discrimination.
Another confounding factor in promotion age discrimination
disputes is that the impact of age on decision makers, whether real or
perceived, may be entirely different depending upon whether the
employees are in their forties, fifties or sixties. A study that looks at the
entire range of those over forty may miss significant differences. It is
entirely possible that persons in their forties may be favored while
persons over sixty may be disfavored.' 20 On the other hand, selecting an
arbitrary group of people for analysis may simply be an effort to tailor
the statistical result to an anomaly in a small group of persons. By
selecting a group of persons around the age of the complaining
individuals, it is possible to avoid both problems. For example, if the
complainant is forty-eight years old, selecting persons from the five-year
group forty-six through fifty (two years on each side of the subject) and
comparing them to persons under forty is both defensible in terms of the
question presented and avoids the risk that persons not subject to the
same perceptions as the subject are being considered.
There are other methods available to measure age discrimination in
promotion. First, there are at least a few national studies showing
promotion rates at various ages. While these may often show trends
rather than precise rate, evidence that the subject company's promotion
rates for the older age group dropped significantly below those averages,
may, if unexplained, be probative of age bias. However, the comparison
will be difficult where the companies age demographics or tenure pattern
differ from the national averages. Second, if the company's evaluation
data is well calibrated, a regression that accounts for difference in
evaluation and continues to show a statistically significant age bias will
be probative of discrimination. However, it is important to appreciate
just how probative the statistics may be in individual cases. For
example, if the well done statistical analysis shows an impact on five
percent of the class, that proof should have only a slight impact on the
120. See, e.g., Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1283.
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individual case. However, if the well done statistical analysis shows on
impact on fifty percent of the class, the probative value of this study on
each individual case should be significant. Both of these studies may
show a very significant deviation but the impact on the individual case
should be quite different.
Third, if there has been a substantial decrease in the average age of
persons at the top levels of the company, this may be significant.
However, it is certainly the case that as people retire they will normally
be replaced by younger individuals.1 21  With a relatively stable
workforce in terms of size, the number leaving for retirement at any
point in time should not change dramatically and one can expect the
average age to remain fairly stable. A substantial decrease in the
average age of senior management is probative of an age issue in the
absence of a reasonable explanation. On the other hand a workforce
with a high percentage of older employees at the highest levels
demonstrates the absence of age discrimination against older workers.
The non-discriminatory pattern is particularly compelling where the
average age of senior management is increasing. Finally, if the company
maintains historic promotion records, there ought to be comparable
promotion rates for older employees historically and for the current
period. Again, there may be explanations for a change, favoring
younger employees, but a significant change in the absence of a
reasonable explanation, ought to be probative of age discrimination.
VI. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF AGE DISCRIMINATION IN TERMINATION
CASES
Cases involving reductions in force or a significant series of
individual terminations often involve the use of statistical evidence by
both parties. The employers reason for the termination program will
often be economic need and for particular individuals evaluations of
performance or job eliminations. The statistical analysis often begins
with a simple comparison between the percentage of older versus
younger employees terminated. When these simple comparisons
demonstrate a significant deviation in favor of younger employees, the
employer will respond that the analysis fails to compare correct
employee groups. The employer will argue that it phased out certain job
categories that were no longer necessary or that it relied upon job
evaluations so that job category or evaluations need be considered in any
121. E.g., Block-Victor v. CITG Promotions, L.L.C., 665 F. Supp. 2d 797, 809 (E.D. Mich.
2009).
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STATISTICAL PROOF IN AGE DISCRIMINATION
analysis.
If the defense is that certain job categories were eliminated, the
primary question will be whether or not those jobs were actually
eliminated or whether the defense is a pretext. The answer will be
determined by the extent to which the job duties in eliminated job
categories have actually been eliminated or simply spread to other
employees. Ultimately, a fair comparison for the regression will be of
those employees who were or are performing similar continuing job
duties within the company.
If an employer maintains that the basis for the termination was
some form of performance evaluation, absent a showing of bias in the
evaluations, those evaluations need to be used in the regression.
22
General statistics, without more, are unlikely to rebut the employer's
offered reason. 123 If evaluations are reasonably precise and completely
included in a regression and the result remains a statistically significant
deviation in favor of younger employees, this will create an inference of
discrimination both to support a prima facie case and as evidence of
pretext. As discussed earlier, where evaluations have been used for the
purposes of determining layoff priority, older workers will score, on
average, below younger workers in the company as a whole and within
any employment strata. Therefore, there may be a greater percent of
older workers laid off in the absence of age discrimination. This
phenomenon may cause a decrease in the average age of the workforce
in those categories. Evidence of a significant reduction in average age
for an employee group may be probative if not adequately explained by
evaluation results. 114  It is obvious, however, that when any group of
employees is replaced by newly hired or promoted group, the average
age may decrease because newer employees will generally be younger.
But with a reduction in force ("RIF"), there should be a limited number
of new hires so that average age in a RIF analysis should not be
impacted by new and younger hires.
122. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 371 n.1 I (2d Cir. 1999); Furr v. Seagate Tech.,
82 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1996); Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.
1994) (discussing how in order to create an inference of discrimination, the analysis must eliminate
nondiscriminatory explanations).
123. EEOC v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1996).
124. Compare Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 611 (8th Cit. 1997) (plaintiffs
statistical evidence of the defendant company's trend toward placing younger persons in director-
level positions and eliminating older persons was admissible as probative circumstantial evidence of
pretext), with Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
plaintiff's statistical evidence was not probative because "[tihe statistical disparity in regards to
termination rates is explained by the fact [that] older persons tend to occupy" the positions in
question).
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VII.STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN AGE CLASS ACTION DETERMINATIONS
Statistical analysis has achieved a prominent but misunderstood
role in the battle over class certification. As courts increasingly accept
the propositions that more than a prima facie showing of the Rule 23
elements is necessary (that the plaintiff must show these elements by a
preponderance of the evidence and that expert testimony will be
thoroughly examined) courts will take a more rigorous look at the
validity of statistical evidence and the actual impact of that evidence on
the elements of Rule 23. At the class certification stage, the court will
have to make a decision about which statistical analysis is correct. In
class actions where the focus is on injunctive relief and there are
numerous members of the class, statistical evidence showing
commonality will be sufficient to carry the day since the (b)(2) class
does not require a showing of predominance. 12 5 Commonality has a
relatively low threshold of proof so that where certification under Rule
23(b)(2) is appropriately sought and the statistical evidence makes a
showing that the party "has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class" there is sufficient statistical evidence to certify
the class for "final injunctive relief.'' 126 On the other hand, where the
significant purpose of the litigation is damages for a class, the statistical
analysis must be much more exact.' 27 With a proposed Rule 23(b)(3)
class asserting damages, there must be a showing that the questions of
law or fact common to class members "predominate" over questions
affecting only individual claims and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.
28
The disparate impact case relies on a statistical analysis both for the
merits and the Rule 23 determination. A properly constructed regression
analysis can show that a certain employment practice led to employment
results disadvantaging older employees. The employment practice, but
not necessarily any individual action, is common to all class members.
Causation at the individual level is not necessary for injunctive relief so
the skewed employment result supports the claim for injunctive relief
and a 23(b)(2) class. Whether the statistics will support a 23(b)(3)
damage class is a much more difficult question even in a disparate
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
126. Id.
127. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 720-21 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,415 (5th Cir. 1998)).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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STATISTICAL PROOF IN AGE DISCRIMINATION
impact class. If the statistical work shows that all or most of the
proposed class is impacted by the practice, predominance is established.
However, if the statistics demonstrate that only some class members
were impacted, a damage claim in a disparate impact case will still
involve individual questions to determine which class members were
negatively impacted and are entitled to damages.
In those disparate treatment cases where the employer relies on an
assessment of the employee's ability or productivity for the decision,
class actions involving promotion or termination involve substantial
individual questions. In these cases the liability of the employer to the
individual will depend on an analysis of that individual's productivity as
compared to those who were paid more, were promoted or were not
terminated. These are inherently individual questions. The amount of
damage that an individual may have suffered, assuming liability, may
sometimes be common but more often is an individual question
depending upon the timing of the decision, the individual's base pay, the
remaining available period for work or offsets for re-employment, etc.
Can statistical evidence, perhaps combined with company-wide
anecdotal evidence, create a scenario where it is fair to conclude that
common questions predominate?
Statistical evidence is often offered in this context to establish a
pattern or practice. If there is a finding of pattern or practice, this creates
an inference that a discriminatory act occurred with regard to the
individual claimants in the class. 129 In the Rule 23 analysis the weakness
of any statistical evidence, however, is that while statistics can
demonstrate that a particular employment result across a class is not
random, they cannot tell you whether there was causation or
discrimination in any individual case. Except for the very unlikely
situation in which statistics demonstrate that all observed results are
contrary to expectations, there will always remain individual questions
about whether any particular determination was caused by
discrimination or appropriate considerations.
Statistical significance alone is not a particularly helpful tool in
resolving this issue. A high statistical significance will tell you that the
likelihood of a particular result occurring by chance is remote. It will
not necessarily tell the degree to which the many results were
inappropriate, and particularly, cannot tell you which of the individual
decisions were inappropriate.
In Teamsters, the United States Supreme Court described the
evidence necessary to show a pattern and practice claim as actions of the
129. See Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (1977).
2010]
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employer demonstrating that discrimination was its ordinary course of
conduct rather than the exception.1 30 "Stated differently, the class must
prove that the 'discrimination was the company's standard operating
procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice."" 3' To illustrate
the statistical issue this presents for class certification, assume that the
plaintiff presents a statistical study of an employer's workforce with a
purported class of 5,000 employees over forty where there are also 5,000
employees under forty. The plaintiffs statistical evidence, after some
adjustments for appropriate variables, shows that the older group
received 1,300 promotions, while the younger group received 1,500 with
a discrepancy of 200 and that the standard deviation is well in excess of
three. Plaintiff argues that 200 individuals experienced discrimination in
promotion demonstrating a pattern and practice, commonality and
predominance. Conversely, defendant argues that even crediting
plaintiffs statistics only four percent of the class arguably experienced
discrimination while a very large percentage of persons in the class were
actually promoted. Does this evidence demonstrate that discrimination
was the exception rather than the rule?
The impact on the litigation of a finding of pattern and practice is to
create an inference that each of the individual class members
experienced discrimination. When their individual cases are tried, that
individual class member begins with the inference that discrimination
occurred. Where the statistics show only a small percent of the defined
class has experienced discrimination, such an inference seems
inappropriate. Where the relief sought is injunctive and the standard is
commonality, this statistical pattern should be sufficient for certification.
Where the statistical work is correctly done those statistics are evidence,
across a broad range of decisions, of the presence of inappropriate
considerations justifying injunctive relief. Where the statistics show that
a significant percent of the class, say fifty percent, was actually impacted
by the decisions an inference is appropriate.
Where damages are sought in the disparate impact or disparate
treatment of age discrimination case, the class must be certified under
Rule (b)(3). 32  Even where a pattern and practice is found and the
statistical evidence shows that the potential discrimination may have
impacted twenty or thirty percent of the class, it is difficult to conclude
predominance is present. There will be a common statistical question,
130. Id. at 336; see also Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. 380 F.3d 459, 463 (8th
Cir. 2004).
131. See Morgan, 380 F.3d at 463 (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336).
132. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
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STATISTICAL PROOF IN A GE DISCRIMINATION
but each individual case will depend on an evaluation of individual
performance and damage quantification. These individual questions will
overwhelm the common question.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Because we, as lawyers, are not always intimately familiar with
statistical evidence, we have, at times, tended to place undue emphasis
and reliance on it, particularly in areas like age discrimination claims.
Statistical evidence can be useful in evaluating claims for injunctive
relief, but its limitations in damage claims should not be overlooked.
While discrimination cases are difficult to prove because motive is often
unstated and only in the mind of the decision maker, it should not be an
excuse to use statistical evidence for purposes for which it cannot
adequately serve. In many areas of the law we evaluate motive on the
basis of evidence surrounding individual decisions. Absent statistical
evidence showing an impact on a majority of class members, in most
damage cases of age discrimination, reliance on individual evidence
remains the best and most useful approach.
2010l
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Average Total Compensation By Age Group 
Salaried . Exempt E ployees 
Full Time ActIve Year End 2006 
3640 41-45 46050 
Age Group 
5118,889 
51-65 56-60 60+ 
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